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When a dancer enters the stage to perform, her intention will most 
often be to communicate with her audience. Using her movements, 
emotional and physical expressivity, postures and rhythms she will 
tell a story, express an atmosphere, explore an emotional or mo-
tional theme or an idea, or in other ways present – as well as consti-
tute – the piece of art in question. 
Doing what one has learned by heart during classes and in the 
studio, in other words automatically performing one’s second na-
ture is often not satisfactory to the professional. During her bodi-
ly work the dancer will most often aim at using her prepared and 
incorporated moves, steps and expressions to explicitly articulate 
what she wants to share with the world. 
%rough the work on stage further understandings of the dance 
piece’s content, or understandings of the other, of their interac-
tions, of life situations mirrored in the performance’s sequences, 
might reveal itself to the dancer – as it might to her co-dancers, the 
musicians – and in the better cases to the audience as well.  
Artists from different fields seem to share this experience: bodily 
and emotional work has the capacity to lead to insights and knowl-
edge. As a philosophy student I was thus looking forward to learn 
about the structures behind this transcendence of the bodily and 
emotional self, and to define this particular path to cognition. By 
the end of our master programme it had still not been mentioned, 
and I asked a professor, a phenomenologist working on music. Well, 
when it comes to terminology no one has really pinned that out, he 
said apologetically. What you will find is that it is not recognized as 
a path to higher cognition.
Provoked and inspired I started the process of verbalizing and 
defining my own experiences of bodily consciousness in perform-
ing situations. I read up on the classical phenomenological descrip-
tions of embodiment, and on emotional and embodied cognition. 
And I realized that even within the most body-embracing philo-
sophical tradition, phenomenology, and the most up-to-date work 
on embodied cognition, we still operate with a hierarchy where 
emotional and embodied experiences of the self are seen as basic 
foundations for higher order conceptual reflection (Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2008; et al.). I read up on the current philosophical debate 
on expertise (Shear, 2013; Dreyfus 2005, 2013; Montero 2013), and 
I learned that the discussion on self-consciousness in skilful activ-
ity is framed as a question about whether the expert performer of 
bodily action is reflecting upon herself and her activity, or wheth-
er she is bodily absorbed and thus pre-reflectively self-conscious 
– and I thought: To reflect or not to reflect – is that the question?
Further studies of the work of dance philosophers like Maxine 
Sheets-Johnstone, Jaana Parviainen, Dorothée Legrand, Susanne 
Ravn and Barbara Montero, as well as a closer reading of Mer-
leau-Ponty’s essays on the painting artist (Merleau-Ponty, 1993) 
made me realize that I was not completely off-track; they all discus 
the state of self-consciousness that my former colleagues and I have 
experienced. 
I empirically recognize and theoretically appreciate these phi-
losophers’ elaborations on dancers’ states of self-consciousness, 
described by for instance Sheets-Johnstone as thinking in move-
ment (1980; 2009; 2011; 2012), by Parviainen as thinking through 
movements in order to poetise meaning (1998), and by Legrand 
and Ravn as a form of reflective consciousness at the bodily level 
(Legrand & Ravn 2009, Legrand 2013). But these phenomenolog-
ical descriptions seem to exceed the theoretical understanding of 
reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness found in classical 
phenomenology. %e descriptions of the dancer’s state of self-con-
sciousness have the common peculiarity of covering embodied 
absorption and reflective awareness experienced simultaneously. 
%eoretically we know that the reflecting subject observing her 
movements and herself attentively cannot continuously stay in the 
immediacy of her pre-reflective experience. Pre-reflective self-con-
sciousness is an integral part of phenomenal consciousness, and it 
constitutes the reflective experience, but it cannot in itself be an 
object to the subject. To be pre-reflectively self-conscious is a sin-
gle experience with an immediate and non-observational nature, 
whereas reflective self-consciousness is a situation involving two 
experiences of the self; 1) the experience of reflecting, and 2) the 
experience of being the object reflected upon. %e experience and 
consciousness of the self-alters through reflection, and differs ir-
reducibly from the experiences of the pre-reflective self (Gallagh-
er & Zahavi, 2008: 50-57; Zahavi, 1999:198). In other words, the 
phenomenological framework is challenged when it comes to an 
understanding and a definition of dancers’ experiences of being, as 
some dancers describe it: in a trance and yet hyper-aware.
Writing about this dilemma I made theoretical as well as quali-
tative research. I interviewed four dancers; a classical ballet dancer, 
a contemporary dancer, a classical Indian dancer, and a former bal-
let dancer now choreographer. As the general performing situation 
aggregates a wide range of experiences of the self, the interviewees 
report of various incidents of being reflectively self-conscious, as 
well as incidents of being pre-reflectively bodily immersed in their 
actions. But to three out of four research objects the abovemen-
tioned puzzling bodily transcendence is the pursued and preferred 
state of self-consciousness while working on stage. Aligning the 
empirical material with the phenomenological theory on reflection 
and pre-reflection, I realized that the interviewed dancers describe 
this specific bodily self-consciousness on stage with terminology 
traditionally used on the order of reflection: they are attentive – 
bodily attentive, that is. %ey are intensely self-aware, explicitly 
aware of the other and the world, and they are disclosing experiences 
through transformation – by means of the body. %ey are emotion-
ally and-or bodily articulating what they experience pre-reflectively, 
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and they are – through their bodily selves – thematically trans-
forming or reproducing something received or grasped from their 
second-nature, from other pre-reflective experiences, or even from 
conceptual ideas.
%ese are word-to-word descriptions of reflection (Husserl, 
1960:38; Husserl, 2012:68; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008:46; Zaha-
vi, 1999:62). One might assume this as indications of conceptual 
reflectivity; yet, there is a simultaneous lack of thinking and con-
ceptual control in this state. %e dancers report of having artistic 
blackouts, feeling something taking over, feeling someone else lead-
ing their arms and legs, experiencing being in a trance. %ey notice 
how movements and expressions are appearing through their body, 
and they experience artistic material asserting itself through them. 
Let‘s have a closer look at the descriptions a couple of the inter-
viewed dancers gave. Performing, contemporary dancer Pedersen 
claims to have experiences consisting of attentive awareness and 
various degrees of absorption simultaneously. She is generally what 
she calls mega conscious on stage – as one has responsibilities and 
has to be extremely aware, as she puts it. Occasionally she experi-
ences getting into a trance. %e absorption that she describes as a 
trance does not intrude with her awareness, on the contrary: One is 
still fully awake, she says, actually more awake than when walking 
down the street. Pedersen describes her body as being extremely 
alert in this state, as if even the hairs on my arms are aware of what 
is going on. 
In this state she does not register personal emotions or bodily 
feelings, such as whether the room is cold or warm, or if she feels 
low, or in good spirits, on a private level. Pedersen clearly feels her 
bodily presence in the space and is observant and attentive when 
it comes to the other dancers and their activities – putting out my 
feelers. Even though her awareness is upon the world around her, 
she is just as aware of her own dance work. %rough her descrip-
tions it seems evident, that she is experiencing a bodily focus on 
the living body (Leib), rather than on the physical (Körper). Bare-
ly recognizing her anatomical body, the work takes place in what 
she calls a transformation of her emotional expression through the 
movements. 
Pedersen is not taking her physical body as an object and her 
state of awareness cannot be defined as a reflection upon her own 
body as such. She is sensuously and kinaesthetically alert and fo-
cused on her task, which is attended to with great explicitness as 
she discloses the theme of the choreography through this trans-
formative process. %rough her kinaesthetical interpretation the 
choreography unfolds and reveals its inherent sense and meaning. 
Pedersen is thus both absorbed, attentive, and transforming her 
material, simultaneously.
Modern ballet dancer and choreographer Holm is a former solo 
ballet dancer. During the five decades he has created dance per-
formances, Holm claims to have depended upon his body, his 
sensuousness and imagination, rather than upon conceptual deci-
sion-making and planning. He calls it an anti-method, and he feels 
convinced that his huge load of previous events and factual knowl-
edge – cooperating with his personal intuitive ability to sort out – 
simply dictate him from the first line (Holm, 2013:31). %ese expe-
riences seem to be of a pre-reflective character; Holm relies on his 
embodied skills that after a lifetime of professional bodywork have 
become second nature to him. But Holm additionally refers to the 
process of choreographing as a reproduction of something received 
– from where he is not sure: I’ve never been introduced to the god of 
choreography, or whoever it is talking through me, he says laughing.
When he adjusts the scenes with his dancers, this happens in 
what he calls an attentive trance (Holm, 2013:33). He explains that 
the trance part of it is a one hundred per cent openness, a submis-
sion to his bodily conditions. It is a deliberately chosen state in 
which he pursues his inner vision of the choreography. He cannot 
explain it further, he says, and claims that it is merely a pocket that 
he slips into in order to perform his craft. %e attentive part of it 
lies in how his physical cooperation with the dancers enables him 
to see possibilities in their movements, and in the space where they 
are moving together. 
Holm is bodily attentive and creative as his kinaesthetic, emo-
tional, and perceptual logos is producing the dance steps required 
to finish the choreography of the performance he has in mind – as 
well as in body. 
%us, there seems to be an experientially lived as well as theo-
retically seen experience in which the subject’s bodily self “thinks”, 
or reflects, or accesses herself as object, through, or in, or by means 
of her embodied activity – in which she is completely immersed. 
Even though it shares certain structures with the other states, this 
proposed third state of self-consciousness appears irreducible to 
reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness respectively. In this 
state the subject’s attention is springing from and is of her bodily 
self, more specifically the subject’s movements and-or her emo-
tions, that is her living body – what we know as Leib (Husserl, 1952).
In summing these observations up, we can see that the state 
of self-consciousness in question is reflective, non-conceptual, 
and embodied. As a reflective state it takes objects. Yet it stays 
in the immediacy of the lived body. !is phenomenon has been 
described dance-scientifically as well as philosophically. Yet, it 
contradicts the phenomenological theoretical framework. It is 
in need of comprehensive academic elucidation. 
I call this distinct state of self-consciousness embodied re-
flection.  Embodied reflection shares the characteristic immedi-
acy with pre-reflective self-consciousness, the, in Husserl’s words 
straightforward mode with which one undergoes one’s experience 
(Husserl, 1960:34). %ere is no switch from implicit embodiment 
(pre-reflection) to a focus of the mind (reflection), the change in 
the way the object appears to the subject happens and stays with-
in the embodied realm. Another characteristic embodied reflec-
tion shares with pre-reflection is the lack of conceptual reflection. 
When artists report of having had blackouts or having been in a 
trance these are to be recognized as experiences where conceptual 
thinking was momentarily kept on hold. To reflect in bodily terms 
is the experience of having an extremely intense focus through the 
embodied-emotional self, in a situation where one is absorbed in 
an activity of a bodily or emotional nature. Even though the artist 
might not rationally remember her experience on stage after hav-
ing been in a trance, and she might be unable to give a verbalized 
account of the experience, her bodily self remembers and is indeed 
aware of the transformation she has undergone: after such a perfor-
mance one often feels fulfilled, elated, euphoric, or high. It seems 
evident that artistic blackouts are neither experience of loosing 
one’s consciousness, nor of loosing one’s self. On the contrary, it is 
an experience of a radical focus within the self – within the embod-
ied self. %e notion of self-forgetfulness in absorbed activity reveals 
a dualistic approach to the self; it speaks of the self exclusively as 
minded, ignoring the self-experience of the bodily self.
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I have hereby presented the proposition of a reflective order of em-
bodiment. To reflect through the bodily aspect of the self is neither 
mystical, nor is it exclusively experienced by artists or experts. I 
believe we all have the capacity to reflect emotionally and bodily – 
playing as children, during erotic convergence, and during sports, 
yoga or meditation, just to mention some situations. It is the uni-
versal human experience of being profoundly focused through 
non-conceptual parts of the self. Elaborating further upon dancers’ 
manifold experiences of embodied self-consciousness might lead 
us to a broader understanding of these human cognitive recourses.
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